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Jacobs: Fits and Starts for Mandatory Arbitration

FITS AND STARTS FOR MANDATORY
ARBITRATION
Roger B. Jacobs*
Mandatory arbitration is in the legal news almost daily. Whether it
is a dispute among condominium owners regarding repairs in Bell Tower
Condominium Ass'n v. Haffert, cell phone add-ons that reached the
Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,2 landlord-tenant
disputes, partnership disputes, and of course traditional employment
disputes, among others, a significant concern is the potential diminution
of rights and remedies. However, those concerns can be ameliorated by
an arbitration agreement as well as through the scope of authority of
arbitrators. The ABA Litigation Journal recently had a discussion on the
expansive/expensive process of arbitration and proposed methods of
curtailing this process. 3
The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") is discussing
"muscular" arbitration and focusing heavily on streamlining the arbitral
process so that it does not just mimic federal court litigation. Some of
these problems can be resolved by the parties themselves. However,
without fully addressing the "adhesion" issue, form agreements often
Formulaic arbitration
specify the process without a discussion.
* Roger B. Jacobs is principal at Jacobs Law Offices, LLC and has written frequently on

arbitration topics. He is also an arbitrator and mediator at FINRA, AAA, and the United States
District Court. He is a graduate of Cornell University and New York University School of Law.
Roger Jacobs would like to acknowledge the assistance of Laura Maletta who did most of the
research, particularly regarding historical context. Laura is a 2011 graduate of the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law. She is admitted in New York and New Jersey and is currently working in
the New York State Attorney General's Office.
1.
2.
3.
2010,

33 A.3d 1235, 1237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
Steven Seidenberg, InternationalArbitration Loses its Grip, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 1,
AM),
4:30

http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/international-arbitration

loses its-grip/.

4. See Richard J. Webb, American Arbitration Association Calls for Muscular Arbitration,
2012),
(Mar.
20,
ADR
BLOG
NEUTRAL
HEALTHCARE

http://www.healthcareneutraladrblog.com/2012/03/articles/healthcare-arbitration/americanarbitration-association-calls-for-muscular-arbitration/.
5. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. ata 1744.
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provisions would have to be reviewed and tailored.
One of the essential problems is that a "one size fits all" solution
simply does not work. Just as there are different issues in matrimonial,
commercial, construction, employment, and other disputes, mandatory
arbitration provisions need to address those "industry" specific concerns.
The remedy seems to be far simpler since a process that permits the
parties to obtain the same remedy a court or jury could impose should
eliminate that particular question. The process is more complicated and
needs to be thought through on a systemic basis to avoid issues of
unfairness, among other things.6
It does not appear that the enthusiasm for mandatory arbitration is
ebbing, at least in the courts. Uniformly, the Supreme Court and other
courts continue to echo the notion that arbitration is an effective system
favored, even if the arbitration is a
of dispute resolution and is strongly
7
process.
adhesionary
an
of
result
Let's look at employment for a moment. In D.R. Horton, Inc. and
Cuda,8 the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") recently unsettled
the entire area of arbitration by holding that although individual
arbitration was acceptable, any agreement that barred class claims would
violate the National Labor Relations Act, even in an unorganized shop. 9
Despite the fact that a two-member panel was acting at the time,'0 D.R.
Horton will no doubt ripple through the court system until a likely
decision, again, is reached in the Supreme Court. Collective action and
class claim resolution is but one of the issues regarding arbitration. 1
In our discussion, we examine the historical antecedents of
mandatory arbitration in various aspects of life through its current
iterations and conclude that mandatory arbitration - with several tweaks
that we will discuss - can be an effective tool to regulate commerce, the
workplace, and interpersonal relationships.

6. For example, in a recent case in New Jersey, a malpractice claim was filed against an
attorney who had suggested a matrimonial dispute could be expedited and handled cheaper in
arbitration. Goodwin v. Donahue, Hagan, Klein, Wensome & O'Donnell, No. L-2885-09, 2011 WL
6845888, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2011). The court rejected such a claim in part
because public policy encourages arbitration, especially in matrimonial cases. Id. at *2.
7. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745; Goodwin, 2011 WL 6845888, at *2.
8.

12-CA-25764, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 11 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012).

9. See id. at *16-17.
10. Id. at *1.
11. For example, in Puerto Rico there is formulaic severance required from termination to
resolve employment disputes. Perhaps in tandem with mandatory arbitration, this approach could
obviate many problems.
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I.

A HISTORY INFAVOR OF ARBITRATION

PrimaPaint Corporationv. Flood
& Conklin Manufacturing
2
Company'

While the brunt of this case did not involve mandatory arbitration
clauses, the dicta of PrimaPaint shed some light on the Court's view of
mandatory arbitration. In footnote nine, the Court noted that section 1 of
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") expressly excluded arbitration
clauses whenever one of the parties to an arbitration clause has little
bargaining power.13 Therefore, if an employee had little to no
bargaining power when signing an employment contract that included a
mandatory arbitration clause, a court could potentially hold that the
arbitration clause was unenforceable. However, in Prima Paint, the
Court held that because there was no claim that a party was fraudulently
induced to enter the agreement to arbitrate, the clause was broad enough
to encompass the claimant's allegations of fraud. 14 Also, since it was
never claimed that the parties intended that "legal" issues relating to the
contract be excluded from
arbitration, it was held to be arbitrable under
15
FAA.
the
of
4
section
Justice Hugo Black, however, did not agree with the Court's
decision. 16 According to Black's interpretation of the FAA, claims of
fraud were grounds to rescind the contract because sections 2 and 3 of
the FAA provided that if the Court found that there were grounds for
revoking a contract, such as fraud, then there was no contract therefore, nothing to arbitrate.17 He stated that section 4's inquiry
whether the making of an arbitration agreement was at issue was to be
determined by reference to state law.' 8 Therefore, because New York
law (the applicable state law) did not provide for severability when there
were general allegations of fraud, Justice Black reasoned that the arbitral

12. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
13. Id.at 402-03 n.9.
14. Id. at 406-07. The arbitral agreement at issue provided: "Any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration ....
" Id. at 398. Arbitral agreements that include the phrase "arising out of or relating
to" are generally considered to be broad enough to cover any dispute arising out of the parties'
dealings with one another. See PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, ET AL., FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 298 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
15. PrimaPaint, 388 U.S. at 403-04, 406.
16. Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 412-13.
18. See id.at423.
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agreement was unenforceable.1 9 Despite Justice Black's reasoning, the
Supreme Court has continued to find in favor of enforcing arbitration
clauses and as discussed in this article, even mandatory arbitration
clauses.2 °
21

First Options of Chicago,Inc. v. Kaplan

In First Options, the issues revolved around whether the arbitrator
or the court had the power to decide arbitrability and if the court's
review must be made de novo.22 The Kaplans had signed four different
agreements with First Options, as individuals, as well as for the
24
company that they owned, MKI.2 3 Both 23
owed First Options money.
Only one contract contained an arbitration clause - the contract between
First Options and MKI, not the contract between the Kaplans and First
The Kaplans were not an implied party to the arbitration
Options.2
agreement since the Kaplans did not personally sign the contract
between First Options and MKI.26

Despite the lack of direct privity of the arbitration contract between
the Kaplans and First Options, First Options sued the Kaplans
individually. 27 The Kaplans objected. 28 The arbitrators proceeded to
hear the merits of the dispute and found for First Options. 29
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision that the
dispute was not arbitrable, holding that the question of "who" decides
arbitrability turns upon the parties' agreement. 30 The Court also found
that in light of the fact that arbitration is a creature of contract, courts
should defer to the arbitrator if the parties agreed to submit the dispute
and its arbitrability to the arbitrator. 31 Therefore, a court can only set
aside the arbitrator's decision under the narrow grounds of section 10 of
the FAA.32
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Seeid at421.
See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
Id. at 938.
Id. at 941.
Id. at 940.
Id.
Id. at 941.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 943, 947.
Id. at 943.
Id.
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Generally, the standard of review for the courts is the state law
principles that ordinarily apply in interpreting the formation of
Because Pennsylvania law required the parties to
contracts.3 3
objectively reveal intent to submit the arbitrability issue to arbitration,
the award against the Kaplans personally was found to be invalid.34 The
issue to
Kaplans had not revealed their intent to submit the arbitrability
35
Options.
First
with
contracts
individual
the
for
arbitration
After First Options, a court must make an independent review
when deciding if questions of fact are not "clearly erroneous" and when
reviewing legal questions de novo. 36 Since the question of whether a
mandatory arbitration agreement is fair is a factual issue, a district
court's decision that the arbitration agreement is fair is not likely to be
reversed on appeal.
37
Buckeye Check Cashing,Inc. v. Cardegna

Although mandatory arbitration was not a concern in this case, the
Supreme Court's analysis of precedent and the applicability of state law
are important to note. As seen in Concepcion and other lawsuits,
plaintiffs' attorneys have often invoked state law claims of fraud or
unconscionability when arguing against mandatory arbitration clauses
that ban class-arbitrations.3"
The Court's reasoning in Buckeye has been interpreted to create "an
explicit federal policy imposing arbitration., 39 Buckeye reaffirmed the
Court's prior rulings in favor of arbitration over traditional litigation and
was relied upon in the recent decisions concerning arbitration
Some scholars have concluded that
agreements in employment.40
Buckeye has also been accepted worldwide. 41 This development makes
33. Id. at 944.
34. Id. at 944, 946-47.
35. Id. at 946.
36. Id. at 948.
37. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
38. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742, 1761 (2011) (citing
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005); Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376
F.3d 656, 661 (2004); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Morgan
Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 547 (2008);
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411,414 (1889)).
39. Timothy S. Hall, The Future of Judicial Policing in Consumer Contracting After Buckeye
Check Cashing 17 (Feb. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
40.

See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 440.

See ANDREW DE LOTBINIIRE MCDOUGALL & LEON IOANNOU, SEPARABILITY SAVED:
US SUPREME COURT ELIMINATES THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (2006), availableat
41.
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U.S. law more compliant with international law in finding that the
arbitrator, and not the court, is the body to decide contractual issues.42
In Buckeye, the Supreme Court stated that there were two types of
challenges to the validity of an arbitral agreement: (1) the arbitral clause;
or (2) "the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects
the entire agreement (e.g. through fraudulent inducement), or on the
ground that the illegality of one of the contract provisions renders the
entire contract invalid. 'A3
44
The Court stated that as explained in Southland Corp. v. Keating,
the FAA created federal substantive, not procedural, law that applied in
both federal and state courts.45 Therefore, state law cannot bar
enforcement of section 2 of the FAA, even if the case involved state law
claims.46 In this case, the Cardegnas were challenging the entire
contract, not solely the arbitration agreement.4 7 The Court held that the
arbitrator must decide the issue of illegality. 48

The Court reaffirmed

Prima Paint'sholding that state law on severability is not relevant. 49 It
opined that "a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and
not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator." 50
Further, the Court found that since a state could not create an artificial
defense that ran counter to federal law, the state law was invalid.5" The
Court concluded that defendants are limited to common law defenses
under the FAA.52
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, explaining that, similar to
Justice Black in Prima Paint,he does not believe that the FAA applies to

http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/aa8fd727-7927-440f-8ee896b9a5752f82/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/870b81 f2-e957-457c-8ceda302e80524d4/articleSeparatability/20Saved.pdf.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445.

46.

Id

47.

Id. at 443.

48.
49.

Id. at 446, 449.
Id at 445-46.

50.

Id. at 449. Notably, "[i]f International Arbitral Law is applicable, the arbitral tribunals

are the competent authority" in determining the validity of an arbitration agreement. Emine Eda
Cerrahoglu Balssen, Competent Authority to Decide on Validity of Arbitration Agreements, INT'L
LAW
OFFICE
(Oct.
I,
2009),

http://www.intemationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g-4127ead9-2772-463b-a226ce03dO347bab.
51. See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 446.
52. See id. at 443-45, 447.
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proceedings in state court. 53 However, despite Justice Thomas's dissent,
the Buckeye Court re-affirmed its commitment to enforcing arbitration
agreements, even those that are mandatory clauses included in a larger
contract.54
Buckeye and the other authority already discussed aid in
understanding the general background from which the Court approaches
However, in order to obtain a clearer
arbitration in general.
understanding to how the employment sector is affected by the
judiciary's approach to arbitration, and what type of mandatory
arbitration clause a court is likely to find to be fair and enforceable, we
need to examine recent decisions specifically revolving around
employment contracts.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND MANDATORY
ARBITRATION CLAUSES

Jock v. SterlingJewelers, Inc.55
Jock is a recent employment case dealing with an arbitrator's
decisions and class arbitration.56 Moreover, it provides an example of
how employers do not always benefit from including a mandatory
arbitration clause in employment contracts.5 7
Plaintiffs, current and former employees of Sterling, a national
jewelry company, filed a discrimination claim against Sterling Jewelers,
alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
Equal Pay Act. 58 The employment contract contained an arbitration
agreement. 59 The arbitration clause provided that employees agreed to
arbitrate all employment disputes, including those arising under Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act.6 ° It also required employees to first file a
complaint with the employer's administrator, who would then reach a
decision. 6' If the employee did not agree with the administrator's
decision, he or she could file an appeal to either an outside administrator
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 442-43, 449 (majority opinion).
646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011).
See id.
See id.

58.
59.

Id. at 115.
Id.

60.

See id.at 116-17.

61.

Id. at 115.
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or peer review panel.62 If the employee was still not satisfied with the
result, he or she could file for arbitration, which would be conducted
under the laws of Ohio.63 The arbitration agreement never explicitly
mentioned class actions.64
A number of Sterling employees filed claims together in
arbitration. 65 The arbitrator issued a threshold award, stating that the
arbitration agreement did not prohibit class arbitration under Ohio law
unless there was an explicit provision to the contrary.66 Sterling moved
to vacate the arbitrator's decision.67 The district court denied Sterling's
motion and Sterling appealed.6 8
The mandatory arbitration agreement in Jock was silent regarding
class actions. 69 The Second Circuit ruled that the arbitrator did not
exceed his power in deciding that the plaintiffs were entitled to arbitrate
the claim as a class.7v Since the arbitrator did not violate section
10(a)(4) of the FAA, which provided that awards issued by arbitrators
who exceed their powers are not enforceable, the award was not subject
to vacatur. 7' The court further stated that the issue of whether an arbitral
award is valid was based on "whether the arbitrators had the power,
based on the parties' submissions or the arbitration agreement, to reach a
certain issue, not whether the arbitrators correctly decided that issue.' 7 2
The arbitrator found, and the court affirmed, that because Sterling
never clarified the ambiguity in the arbitration agreement regarding
whether class actions are arbitrable, it must be properly construed
against Sterling. 3 The court stated that since the arbitrator did not act in
"manifest disregard" of the law and because neither the statutory claims,
nor the contract, prohibit class action arbitrations,7 4the court could not
grant the defendant's motion to stay the arbitration.
It is interesting that the Second Circuit decided to word its decision
to include "manifest disregard" of the law after the Supreme Court, in
Hall Street, essentially removed manifest disregard of the law as an
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.at115-16.
Id.at116-17.
Id.at117.
Id.at116.
See id at117.
Id.

68.

Id. at117-18.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.at117.
Id.at127.
Id.at121-23.
Id.at122.

73.

Id.at117, 124.

74.

Seeid. at117-18.
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argument for vacatur.75 Regardless of the court's rationale, Jock is a
recent example of how mandatory arbitration clauses can sometimes
benefit employees. 76 Jock also served as an example for other employers
that Sterling's error in drafting its arbitration agreement provided
guidance for employers on how to draft mandatory arbitration clauses
(discussed in detail in Part V).
Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc.77
Jewelry Exchange's contract with its employees contained an
arbitration provision with very specific timelines and procedures for
filing individual complaints against the employer.18 It also included a
provision that allowed both Jewelry Exchange and the grieving
employee to block a party's nomination for an arbitrator.79 However, the
arbitral clause was drafted so that Jewelry Exchange had one more
opportunity to object to a party-appointed arbitrator than the employee.8 °
The employee in this case, Nino, signed a one-page document agreeing
that he was bound to the grievance procedure provided in the employee
handbook. 8' Significantly, the grievance procedure in the handbook
differed from the employment contract. 82
Nino sued Jewelry Exchange in court rather than filing for
arbitration.83 Jewelry Exchange raised a defense that the case could not
be heard in court due to the arbitration agreement. 84 But, it continued to
litigate the case for fifteen months before it filed the appropriate
motion. 85 , During that time, Jewelry Exchange engaged in a substantial
amount of discovery and, after more than a year into the litigation
process, moved to compel arbitration. 86 In response, Nino argued that
the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, not enforceable, and
75. See Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008).
76. See generally Jock, 646 F.3d at 113 (holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority in allowing the plaintiffs to pursue their claims in class arbitration).
77. 609 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2010).
78. See id. at 197.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 198.
82. Id. Specifically, the handbook does not have an arbitration agreement, requires
employees to file the initial grievance within two days, as opposed to five, and gives the managing
director the final say in all decisions except terminations. Id.
83. See id. at 199.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
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waived.87
The Third Circuit found that Jewelry Exchange had forfeited its
right to arbitration, despite the mandatory arbitration clause in the
contract.8 8 Due to its delay, the court found that the employer waived its
right to object to the litigation.8 9 The court also reasoned that
unconscionability is a matter of arbitrability, and for the court to decide,
not the arbitrator.90 Because unconscionability is determined by state
law principles, and in this case, the Virgin Islands, the law provided that
in order for a contract to be unconscionable, it must be procedurally
unconscionable (i.e. contracts of adhesion) and substantively
unconscionable. 91 The court found that the contract was substantively
unconscionable since the timelines in the mandatory arbitration clause
were unreasonable and the terms were unreasonably favorable to the
employer/the party requesting arbitration.92 The arbitration agreement
did not penalize Jewelry Exchange if it did not meet the deadlines. 93
Conversely, employees were punished if they failed to meet deadlines
and lost claims.94 Therefore, the court found the arbitration agreement to
be unconscionable and unenforceable. 95 Nino provided an excellent
96
illustration of what not to include in a mandatory arbitration clause.
97

Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson

Rent-A-Center required employees to sign an employment contract
as well as a separate arbitral agreement. 98 The arbitral agreement
contained a provision that all claims, including discrimination, would be
arbitrated. 99 It also provided that the arbitrator would settle issues of
arbitrability.100 After one of Rent-A-Center's employees, Antonio

87. Id.
88. Id. at 209 (discussing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir.
1992)).
89. Id. at 210.
90. See id. at 200 (citing Howsman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
91. Id. at 200-01.
92. Id. at 202.
93. Id. at 207.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 208.
96. The guiding principles for drafting arbitral clauses in light of Nino are examined in this
article. See discussion infra Part V.
97. 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010).
at 2775.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100.

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/7

10

Jacobs: Fits and Starts for Mandatory Arbitration

2012]

FITS AND STARTS

Jackson, filed a discrimination suit, Rent-A-Center moved to compel
arbitration.' 0 ' In opposition,
Jackson argued that the arbitral contract
102
was unconscionable.

Prior to this case, the Court held, in Prima Paint, that Congress
permitted the arbitrator to decide whether an arbitration agreement is
enforceable, unless the claimant specifically alleged that he or she only
agreed to the arbitration clause based on fraud in the inducement.' °3 In
this case, Jackson did not argue that the arbitrator could not decide
whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.'0 4 Rather,
Jackson argued that because the arbitration agreement as a whole was
unconscionable, the entire agreement, including both the arbitration
contact and the employment
contract, was presumptively
unenforceable. 105
The Court found, in Rent-A-Center, that the issue of whether the
entire contract was unconscionable was separate from whether the
arbitral agreement was unconscionable. 10 6 Prima Paint had already set
the standard for separability. 0 7 Thus, in Rent-A-Center, the Court
focused on whether the issue of the unconscionability of the arbitral
agreement was a matter for the arbitrator to decide.'0 8 The Court
decided that it was a matter for the arbitrator, not the court, since it dealt
with the enforceability of the arbitration clause. 0 9 The Court found that
a contract could delegate the power to decide whether an arbitral
agreement is enforceable to the arbitrator under section 2 of the FAA."°
By extension, the arbitrator could also determine whether the agreement
as a whole was enforceable or unconscionable."'
However, the Rent-A-Center Court was not unanimous in its
decision." 12 Leading a four-justice dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens

101.
Id.
102. Id.
103.
See id. at 2778 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Food & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 40304(1967)).
104.
Id. at 2775.

105.

Id. at 2779.

106. Id. at 2778.
107. See id. The doctrine of separability provides that the arbitral agreement stands alone
from the main contract. Thus, even if the main contract was entered into based on fraud in the
inducement, if the arbitral agreement is valid, the parties are obligated to arbitrate whatever claims
are covered by the arbitral agreement. See id.
108.
See id. at 2779.
109.
See id.
110.
Seeid. at2778.
Ill. Id. at 2779.
112. Id. at 2781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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contended that, based on First Options, the Court was required to
perform an in toto review (meaning that both contracts, the employment
113
contract and the arbitral contract, had to be reviewed by the court).
Since a court cannot conclude that a party agreed to arbitrate the
question of arbitrability until it decided whether the agreement was
unconscionable,
the dissent took issue with the majority's analysis as a
4
1
whole.
If Jackson had argued that the arbitration clause itself was
unconscionable or that he was induced to enter the contract based on
fraud, then the Court could have decided differently. However, because
the majority of the Court interpreted Prima Paintto require the Court to
separate the contract from the arbitration agreement, the Rent-A-Center
Court was obligated to allow the arbitrator to decide the issue of
unconscionability of the arbitral agreement." 5
III. FAIRNESS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY IN MANDATORY ARBITRATION

CLAUSES

Employees often argue that the arbitration agreement is either
unfair or unconscionable." 16 This section of the discussion is devoted to
analyzing cases in which the courts have dealt with the issues of fairness
and unconscionability.
"Fairness"in MandatoryArbitration
Arguments regarding the fairness of mandatory arbitration clauses
generally focus on its adhesive nature or on the procedural aspect of the
8 involved
arbitration." 7 Marino v. Writers Guild ofAmerica, East, Inc. H"
113. Seeid.at2782-83.
114. Seeid.at2781-82.
115. See id.at 2779 (majority opinion). It is important to note that the Court's general
composition has not likely changed with Justice Elena Kagan as Stevens' replacement. Therefore, it
is unlikely that the Court would overturn Rent-A-Center or greatly distinguish it as the Court is
currently comprised.
116. See, e.g., id.at 2779-80 (discussing the plaintiffs argument that the entire arbitration
agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable); Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc.,
609 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating the plaintiffs argument that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable and unenforceable).
117. See Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: IsitJust?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1633 (2005) (quoting David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 33,

36-37 (1997)).
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both of these grounds of attack.
The case centered on who was entitled to receive the writing credit
19
for "Godfather III" - Marino, Mario Puzo, or Francis Ford Coppola. 1
After an arbitral award was issued against Marino's favor, Marino
challenged the award and requested a review by the Policy Review
Board, as required under his union contract with the Writers Guild of
America. 12
The Board determined that a122 new arbitration was
unnecessary. 12 1 The arbitration award was final.
In court, Marino made a number of arguments grounded on the
fairness of the arbitration process. Marino argued that the anonymity of
the arbitrators' identities, as required under the union contract, was
unfair. 123 Marino also contended that the arbitral procedures were
improperly applied to him since he was barred from submitting evidence
that was relevant in his opinion and was unable to see Coppola's and
Puzo's written submissions. 124 Lastly, Marino stated25that members of
the arbitral panel did not properly weigh the evidence.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all of Marino's26
arguments regarding the fairness of the decision-making process.
Since the arbitral procedures found in the contract were properly
followed, the arbitration itself was not unfair. 127 The court noted that
employees subject to arbitration were not entitled to all the processes
that are traditionally part of a court procedure. 28 Because Marino did
not object to the arbitral procedures or the alleged unfairness of the
arbitration process throughout the arbitration itself, the court determined
that Marino waived his right to object.129 Therefore,
the court reasoned
30
that Marino was bound by the arbitral process.
Mandatory arbitral agreements in labor law disputes are generally
viewed more favorably than similar agreements in employment law
because labor agreements generally result from arm's length
118.

992 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1482.
Id. at 1482-83.
Id. at1483.
Id.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1486.
See id. at 1486-87.

128. See id. at 1483, 1488. One of the arguments in favor of arbitration is that it should be
more efficient and economical. See id. at 1488.
129. Seeid. at 1484.
130. Id. at 1488.
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negotiations,131 with the members' interests represented by their union
representatives.1 32 In the employment law context, employees are not
usually represented by negotiators when employers are drafting
employment contracts, leaving employees with little real choice other
than to accept an employment contract as presented. 133 However,
employees with union representation sometimes also have little choice
as well. 134 Perhaps
it could be said that "you read it, you sign it, and you
' 35
are bound by it."'
But perhaps the most helpful decision in discussing arbitration,
36
fairness, and unconscionability is Hooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips.
Despite the fact that the Fourth Circuit limited its decision to the specific
facts at hand,
it focused on fairness and unconscionability in mandatory
37
arbitration. 1

The issue in Hooters was whether an employee's Title VII
employment discrimination claims were arbitrable under the
employment contract.138 Although the employee, Phillips, was supposed
to receive a copy of the arbitration rules and procedures, Hooters never
provided her with a set. 139 Phillips
signed the agreement without
40
document.
the
reviewing
or
receiving
The rules that Hooters instituted were stacked against its

131.

See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 4.11 (2010) (requiring arm's length negotiations for federal service

contracts).
132. See Roger B. Jacobs, Supreme Court Tips Against Individual Rights - Again, 27
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 267, 269 (2010).
133. Employment
and
Non-Compete
Agreements,
RIGGAN,
LLC,

http://www.rigganlawfirm.com/lawyer-attorney- 1649233.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
134.

See Robert P. Hunter, Disadvantagesof Union Representation, MACKINAC CENTER FOR

PUB. POL'Y, (Aug. 24, 1999), www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=2313&print=yes (describing the
employee's loss
of individuality upon becoming a member of "an overall bargaining unit in which
the majority rules").
135. Notably, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court rejected the
employee's argument that he did not waive his right to trial by signing the agreement. See 500 U.S.
20, 26 (1991). Some subsequent cases, however, have distinguished Gilmer by reasoning that the
employee in that case was an experienced businessman.
See Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring
Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101,
162 (2010) (citing Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute
ArbitrationAgreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST.J.ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 305 (2003)). The

same can potentially be said of Marino,who was presumably well-educated. See Marino, 992 F.2d
at1481.
136. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
137. Id.
at938.
138. Id. at937.
139. Id. at936.
140. See id. Question to ponder: should the employer be responsible when the employee does
not ask atthe outset to view the arbitration agreement?
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employees. For example, employees were only given five days 14
to
review the arbitral agreement and decide whether to accept or reject it. 1
Phillips argued that such an agreement was unenforceable. 142 Phillips
contended that because the arbitral agreement was a mandatory aspect of
her employment, it was a contract of adhesion and she lacked bargaining
power. 143
The Hooters arbitration procedures were also not even-handed. 144
Hooters was not required to respond to employee claims and essentially
had no limits on who would serve as the arbitrator.1 45 It also had the
right to change the rules at any point in the process and to appeal the
arbitral award when it could show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the arbitrators exceeded their authority.146 Hooters 47employees were
not granted similar rights under the arbitral procedures. 1
The Fourth Circuit determined that "Hooters materially breached
the arbitration agreement by promulgating rules so egregiously unfair as
to constitute a complete default of its contractual obligation to draft
arbitration rules and to do so in good faith."' 148 Accordingly, the court
determined that the arbitral agreement was unenforceable, and Phillips
149
could not be compelled to arbitrate her claim of sexual harassment.
Because of the one-sided nature of the mandatory arbitration clause
in Hooters, the court determined the arbitration agreement to be
unenforceable.150 Courts, however, do not often find the arbitral process
to be a "sham."' 15' Typically, as seen in Rent-A-Center (discussed Part II
infra), courts try152to construe arbitral agreements in a light most favorable
to enforcement.
The UnconscionabilityArgument
In attacking the arbitral agreement, employees often raise the

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 613 (D.S.C. 1998).
144. Hooters ofAmerica, 173 F.3d at 938.
145. Id. at 938-39.
146. Id. at 939.
147. See id at 938-39.
148. Id. at 938.
149. Id. at 940.
150. Id. at 938.
151. See id. at 940.
152. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (using the
doctrine of separability to find the arbitration valid).
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defense of unconscionability. 1' When confronted with this contract
issue, courts use a number of factors to assess the question, including:
whether there was unequal bargaining power, whether the clause was a
contract of adhesion or negotiable, whether deception was used in
making the employee sign the arbitral1 54agreement, and whether there was
an unfair advantage, to list just a few.
Arguments that the arbitration clause is unconscionable rarely
succeed. 155 The unconscionability argument only applies in situations
where there was found to be a contract of adhesion between the
employee and employer. 56 However, on the rare occasion that the
employee persuasively makes out a case of unconscionability, the win is
often short lived. Employers can easily and quickly amend the
mandatory 57arbitration clauses in order to satisfy more stringent
standards.
The Sixth Circuit found an invalid arbitral agreement in Walker v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc. "8 Every employee in Walker was
subject to arbitration based on a mandatory arbitration clause contained
in the application. 59 Employment was conditioned upon signing the
arbitral agreement. 160 Plaintiffs provided evidence that they were rushed
to sign the arbitral agreement and that representatives of Ryan's Family
Steak Houses did not fully or adequately explain the provisions of the
two-page arbitration agreement. 61 Ryan's Family Steak Houses argued
that the mandatory arbitration clause was
enforceable because it was
62
signed before commencing employment.'
The district court found that the arbitral agreement was a classic
contract of adhesion and was not enforceable. 163 On appeal, the Sixth
153. See, e.g., id. at 2775 (arguing that an agreement to arbitrate all "past, present, or future"
employment disputes based on any federal law was unconscionable); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744-45 (2011) (arguing that an agreement to arbitrate all claims by
employees only in their individual capacities and to permit the employer to make unilateral
amendments to the agreement was unconscionable); Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.,
400 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2005) (arguing that an agreement appearing to prohibit class-based
claims was unconscionable).
154. See STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 144 (2d ed. Supp. 2010).
155. See David Horton, Arbitrationas Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437,456 (2011).
156. See HUBER & WESTON, supra note 154, at 129.
157. Id.
158. 400 F.3d at 387.
159. Id. at373.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 373-74.
162. Id. at 380.
163. Id. at 384.
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Circuit found that the contracts of three plaintiffs who were hired prior
to signing the arbitral agreement were ones of adhesion.1 64 The court
opined that because these contracts were ones of adhesion, the alleged
consideration was illusory, rendering the arbitration provisions
unenforceable. 165 All employees of Ryan's Family Steak Houses had a
similar lack of consideration. 166 The court also criticized the employer
for failing to explain the arbitration clauses to the applicants and, when it
did attempt to do so, for haphazardly explaining the agreement, which
was filled67 with inaccuracies regarding the rights the applicants were
waiving.'
The court did not find that the arbitral agreement was definitely
unconscionable.1 68 As a result, in order to find the agreement invalid,
the court had to rely on the fact that the arbitral process itself was
inherently unfair. 169 For example, the three members who would
constitute the arbitral panel were to be selected from three different
lists. 170 The court particularly took issue with two of the lists of
arbitrators. 171 One list consisted of names of supervisors and managers
from one of the signatories of Employment Dispute Services, Inc.
("EDSI," who was also the named respondent in all arbitrations, not
Ryan's Family Steak House). 172 The second list consisted of employees
from another signatory of EDSI. 173 The court found the members of
these lists to be problematic given that the employer's annual fees 1to
74
EDSI consisted of nearly half of EDSI's gross income in one year.
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit determined that due to the symbiotic
relationship between Ryan's Family Steak Houses and EDSI, it was
Ryan's, not EDSI, who effectively determined two-thirds of the
members of the arbitral panel.'75 The court took issue with this
composition of the panel and reasoned
that such a panel would be unfair
17 6
unenforceable.
award
and any
164. Id. at 385.
165. Id. at 381,383.
166. Seeid at 381.
167. Id. at 382,384.
168. Id. at 384-85.
169. Id. at 385-86.
170. Id. at 386.
171. Id. at 386-87.
172. Id.
173. See id. The third list was comprised of attorneys, retired judges, and others in the legal
profession. Id.
174. Id. at 386.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 388.
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The Sixth Circuit also ruled that the limited discovery process EDSI
provided was potentially prejudicial to employees. 17 7 The court
with a potentially
reasoned that the combination of limited discovery
78
biased panel was procedurally unfair to employees. 1
Alternatively, in Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc., 79 the applicable
law of the Virgin Islands required contracts to be both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable to be unenforceable. 80 The Third Circuit
explained that under Virgin Islands law, contracts of adhesion were
In order to be substantively
procedurally unconscionable. 18 1
unconscionable, the contract must contain provisions that are
unreasonably favorable to one party to the detriment of the other.182 In
Nino, the court held that requiring an employee to submit a claim to
arbitration within five days of the event was substantively
unconscionable and unreasonably favorable to the employer."'
Similar to Walker, the Nino court also analyzed whether the arbitral
84
agreement was fair, specifically in terms of the five-day filing period.
The Third Circuit determined that the time period was extremely brief.'8 5
Also, due to the binding timeline, the mandatory arbitration clause was
unenforceable because it was too one-sided. 86 The court found that this
unbalanced approach was "exacerbated" by the fact that the arbitral
liability if it failed
agreement explicitly insulated the employer from any
87
to process an employee's claim in a timely manner.1
Employers must be aware of the potential arguments that may be
Courts continue to carefully
advanced by disgruntled employees.
scrutinize certain mandatory arbitration provisions. But, courts usually
177. Id. at 387.
178. See id.
179. 609 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2010) (exemplifying the general rule that cases dealing with
unconscionability are fact-specific and can be easily distinguished).
180. Id. at 201 (citing Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2007)).
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Id.
at 202. The court had previously found a thirty-day waiting period to be substantively
unconscionable. See Parilla v. lAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2004);
Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, LP, 341 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2003).
184. See Nino, 609 F.3d at 203.
185. Id. at 202-03.
186. Id. at 203.
187.
Id. The court also decided that the arbitral agreement's requirements regarding the
parties' responsibilities for the costs of the arbitration were substantively unconscionable. Id.
However, that issue is outside the scope of this article and will not be addressed. Also, employees
were required to submit their claims to Jewelry Exchange first for an internal grievance process. Id.
at 197. After the internal investigation, employees could submit their claims for arbitration if they
were not satisfied with the internal result. Id.
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do not find contracts to be unenforceable due to unconscionability.188
Perhaps some general guidelines for employers may be helpful when
drafting a mandatory arbitration clause.
IV. PROPOSALS

A mandatory arbitration provision should reduce the costs of
litigation. If it does not, it will not be acceptable to the parties.
Some Thoughts on How to Presenta Mandatory ArbitrationClause
The arbitration agreement should be in bold and CAPITALIZED.
A bold, capitalized clause will prevent employees from later arguing that
they did not have notice of the mandatory arbitration provision or see it
in the contract. It should also be easy to read, unambiguous, and written
in terms the average employee could understand.
The employer should also provide the arbitration agreement to each
employee. Employers should give employees sufficient time to read the
agreement on their own 189 and request a written acknowledgement of the
employee's acceptance of the agreement. A sample agreement is as
follows:
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Each employee agrees that any and all grievances that arise
between any employee and the Company arising during or following the
employee's employment with the company that cannot be resolved by
the Complaint Resolution Procedure set forth in this Handbook shall be
resolved through final, impartial, and binding arbitration.
The arbitration shall be governed by the United States Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator
may be entered by any court having jurisdiction thereof. The place of
the arbitration shall be Somerset, State of New Jersey, and the arbitrator
shall be selected from Panels of the New Jersey Office of the American
Arbitration Association.
Grievances Defined. Under this Agreement, the term "grievances"
188. See HUBER & WESTON, supranote 154, at 144.
189. While this is not mandatory in order to ensure enforceability, it is better to err on the side
of caution. See Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
an employee could not avoid his obligation to arbitrate his Title VII claims based on the fact that he
failed to read the document carefully before signing).
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means any and all past, present, and future claims that arise between any
employee and any of the following: the Company, its employees and
agents (in their capacities), as well as any affiliated companies, benefit
plan sponsors and administrators. Such grievances include, but are not
limited to: statutory and common law claims of discrimination
(including all claims under the Law Against Discrimination); claims for
compensation, retaliatory discharge, benefits; tort claims; claims for
breach of contract; and all other statutory and common law claims
arising out of or relating to the terms and conditions of employment or
its termination.
This Agreement does not apply to claims for workers'
compensation, unemployment compensation, temporary injunctions in
aid of arbitration, the disclosure of trade secrets, or claims of
discrimination before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
or similar administrative agency responsible for ensuring compliance
with fair employment standards.
The Procedure. The aggrieved party must submit written notice to
the other side within the legal time period for filing the claim asserted.
The local Panels of the American Arbitration Association in
Somerset, New Jersey shall be used and the parties shall select a single
arbitrator to conduct the arbitration proceedings under the National
Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
The Arbitrator shall assess the distribution of the costs of arbitration
between the parties. Except that the party that initiated the claim shall
pay an amount equivalent to the filing fees to initiate a claim in a court
of competent jurisdiction.
The Arbitrator shall interpret company policy and state and federal
law as necessary to reach a final, binding, and exclusive decision.
The Arbitrator shall resolve all issues relating to discovery, the
admission of evidence, and the interpretation and enforceability of this
agreement, including whether it is void or voidable.
I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE CAREFULLY READ THE
ABOVE AGREEMENT AND VOLUNTARILY ACCEPT ITS
TERMS.
I UNDERSTAND
THAT
THIS
AGREEMENT
SUPERSEDES
ANY PRIOR AND CONTEMPORANEOUS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE COMPANY AND
MYSELF. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT BY ENTERING INTO
THIS AGREEMENT, BOTH THE COMPANY AND I PROMISE TO
RESOLVE ANY AND ALL GRIEVANCES THAT ARISE BETWEEN
US IN AN ARBITRATION PROCEEDING RATHER THAN A
COURT OF LAW.
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Employee Signature

Signature of Authorized
Company Agent

Employee Name Printed

Authorized Company Agent Name
Printed

Date

Date

Drafting the ArbitrationAgreement
An arbitration agreement should include a severability clause that if
any part of the arbitral agreement is unenforceable, that provision shall
be severed from the rest of the arbitral contract to ensure that the dispute
would still be adjudicated in the arbitral forum.
Other points of reference to create an effective workplace-dispute
grievance alternative include: timelines, the procedure for appointing
arbitrator(s), the scope of workplace claims that will be arbitrated,
discovery procedures, apportionment fees, potential remedies, the award,
and whether the award will be published or kept confidential.
The arbitration agreement should not shorten the statute of
limitations. There should be filing time limits in which employees
should be given the same amount of time to file for arbitration as they
would if they were filing a complaint in a court of law. 190
Regarding the appointment of arbitrators, the employer has a choice
to either have a panel hear the dispute or a single arbitrator. If the
employer elects to have the arbitration heard by a panel of arbitrators,
then it should also include the procedure for the appointment of the
arbitrators. Alternatively, it should select an arbitral institution, such as
AAA, to administer the dispute and adopt the institution's rules
concerning the appointment of arbitrators.
A fair, court-approved manner of appointing a tripartite panel of
arbitrators could be based on Walker in which the employer and
employee each select one arbitrator.1 9' The employer might also supply
190. See, e.g., Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 671-72 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (finding that a six-month time limit to file a claim was unconscionable); see also Evan J.
Spelfogel, The Benefits of Employment Arbitration in Employment Law, 4 N.Y. DIsp. RESOL. LAW.
24 (2011) (suggesting that time limits in mandatory arbitration provisions should be comparable to
any applicable statutes of limitations).
191. See Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2005).
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the employee with a list of arbitrators that describe the arbitrators' track
records and expertise.1 92 Both party-appointed arbitrators subsequently
agree on the third arbitrator, who will serve as chairman. But, this
process may be too cumbersome, time consuming, and, ultimately, too
expensive.
If the employer decides that it wants to have the arbitration heard
by a solo arbitrator due to cost and other factors, the arbitration
provision might provide, for example, that the employee selects the
arbitrator. When the employee selects the arbitrator, any concerns a
court may have of the employer having an "advantage" over an
employee through increased familiarity of the arbitral program
disappears. Of course, a traditional method of striking names from
approved lists could be utilized, leaving the process entirely to an
outside agency (AAA) and following its procedures. Alternatively, the
employer could opt for a rotating and designated panel. Fairness can be
built into each of these processes.
Another factor for employers seeking to arbitrate employment
disputes to consider is providing proper notice to employees. Therefore,
it would also be wise for employers to specifically state that the
arbitration agreement includes statutory claims and to provide a list of
the specific statutes. Additionally, the arbitration agreement should
provide that the employee is allowed to file any claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), NLRB, or any other
administrative agency.' 93 If so, a court will likely compel arbitration.
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams' 94 the Supreme Court
determined that claims that an employer violated statutory employment
laws were arbitrable.' 95 While this is now more important in labor law
196
as opposed to employment law after 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
parties may consider including a clause that the employee agrees to
arbitrate all statutory claims.
Such a clause is another measure
192.

THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 280 (2d ed. 2007)

(regarding mandatory arbitration in consumer disputes).
193. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) ("We have held
that federal statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements ... because the agreement
only determines the choice of forum .... 'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute, it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum') (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
194. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
195. Seeid. at 122-23.
196. See 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (holding that an arbitration clause in an employment contract
requiring union members to waive their right to bring a statutory claim in federal court - in this case
under the ADEA - was valid and enforceable).
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employers can easily take to help ensure enforceability of mandatory
arbitration provisions.
However, even if the employer includes such a prophylactic
provision for arbitrating statutory claims, administrative agencies may
still bring claims against the employer regarding the mandatory
arbitration clause itself.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has recently held that personal injury
claims, such as wrongful death and other tort claims, are not
arbitrable.1 97 Such an exclusion should also be considered when drafting
arbitration agreements.
Remedies
The arbitration agreement should provide that the arbitrator is
entitled to grant any and all remedies that would have been available if
the dispute was adjudicated in court. Such a provision might include
punitive damages, treble damages, and attorneys' fees. 198 It might also
address the concerns of critics of mandatory arbitration clauses and
supporters of the Fairness in Arbitration Act. As a fundamental rule,
arbitration agreements should not abridge an employee's statutory
rights. 199
Dividing up the Fees - How to Preventa Courtfrom Shutting You
Down
Another source of criticism for mandatory arbitration clauses is the
division of fees between employers and employees. Courts might refuse
to enforce arbitration awards due to the division of fees. However, in
Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc.,2°° the Fourth Circuit
held that fee-splitting provisions do not automatically render arbitration
contracts unenforceable. 0 1 It is unlikely that an employer would be able
to "sway" the arbitrator by paying the arbitration fees. The Bradford
court stated that whether the fee allocation is fair should be determined
197. See Graves v. BP Am., Inc., 568 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583
F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009).
198. CARBONNEAU, supranote 192, at 358.
199. See Mark S. Mathison & Bryan M. Seiler, What 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett Means for
Employers, 25 ABA J. OF LAB. & EMP. LAW 173, 193 (2010) (explaining that Pyett does not require
employees to waive their statutory rights, just their "right to a judicial forum as the place to
vindicate statutory rights").
200. 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
201. Id. at 551.
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on a case-by-case basis.2 °2 In federal employment discrimination claims,
the employer could consider a clause that requires employees to pay an
equivalent fee for filing a cause of action in federal court.20 3 On the
other hand, it might be simpler for an employer to absorb the filing fee
or to limit the claimant's fee to the amount incurred by filing in a court
in that jurisdiction and some arbitral costs 20 4 than risk ad hoc decisions
on this point. Employers who pay for arbitration costs ensure that the
arbitration agreement does not force the employee to incur costs that the
employee would not have to otherwise pay in court.20 5 Commentators
have expressed that such a role increases the overall "fairness" of the
mandatory arbitration system.206
If applicable, the arbitration agreement should state that the
employer must pay for the costs of e-discovery. Such a policy
essentially adopts the federal courts' policy of forcing the producing
party to pay the costs 20 7 and would avoid any argument an employee

may have that the arbitration process is unfair and unconscionable.
Amending MandatoryArbitrationAgreements
Some courts have held that employment handbooks that state
employers can alter the terms of the handbook at any time are
unenforceable due to lack of mutuality.2 0 8 This question is one to be
pondered based upon jurisdiction and business needs.
Although
continued employment has generally been held to ratify modifications to
the arbitration agreement, 20 9 employers might consider seeking
employee consent to modifications. Obviously, this issue needs to be
considered based upon the size of the company, technical expertise
202. Id. at 559.
203. See Spelfogel, supra note 190.
204. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999);
Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
205. See, e.g., Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th 107, 115-16 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable because it imposed costs unique to
arbitration, imposed time limits to filing a claim, and limited discovery).
206. But see Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 413-14 (2009) (explaining that once an employer agrees to pay
the costs of arbitration, the possibility of collusion between the employer and the arbitrator arises).
207. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484.
208. See, e.g., Douglass v. Pflueger Hawaii, Inc., 135 P.3d 129, 144 (Haw. 2006) (holding that
the arbitration agreement was illusory and unenforceable because the employer's reserved right to
alter the agreement at any time did not provide "mutuality of obligation").
209. See, e.g., Dantz v. Am. Apple Grp., LLC, 123 F. App'x 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
that the employee's continued employment constituted acceptance by performance of the
employer's unilateral contract).
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required for the job, and practicality. In other words, some changes are
more housekeeping in nature and should be routine when issued.
Substantive changes present a more complicated question and should
usually be handled by widespread dissemination and sign off, either
electronically or otherwise, to insure enforceability.
Providingfor the Award
The arbitral clause should require the arbitrator(s) to write a
comprehensive award.2t0 In other words, it should be clear to the parties
what was decided and the basis for the decision. The parties should
agree to publish the award either by the arbitral institution or the
employer's newsletter unless confidentiality is required. This would
negate critics' arguments that arbitrations do not fully address and
remediate employees' issues due to the private nature of this process.2 1'
V.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Mandatory arbitration is alive and well.
The historical antecedents suggest it will continue to thrive and, in
fact, expand.
Its overall acceptance is, of course, based upon
fundamental fairness.
Arguments regarding contracts of adhesion have largely been
rejected. Providing employees with copies of agreements and requiring
signoff simplifies much of the process.
Fine-tuning needs to be done, particularly in instances where boards
and courts have concerns over class-based waiver of rights. For
example, as the Board ruled in D.R. Horton, individual arbitration was
permissible, but requiring groups of employees to arbitrate was not.
Subject to court review, depending upon the time this article is being
read, D.R. Horton must be accepted at the Board level.
Individualized mandatory arbitration provisions appear to be
generally accepted and will expand.212 The real battle appears to be over
210.
211.

Spelfogel, supra note 190.
See Stemlight, supra note 117, at 1635 (arguing that arbitration is problematic because as

a private process, it is not open to public scrutiny).
212. In Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, the Supreme Court, again, clarified and
restated the favorable position of arbitration. 565 U.S. _ (2012). The Court declared that "[s]tate
and federal courts must enforce the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) ... with respect to all arbitration
agreements covered by that statute." Id. The Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia and said the court had misread and disregarded earlier Supreme Court
precedents interpreting the FAA. Id. The court noted that the West Virginia Court found the FAA's
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coverage to be more limited than mandated by the Supreme Court. Id. In a very clear statement the
Supreme Court said "[w]hen this Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a state court
may not contradict or fail to implement the rule so established." Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2).
The Marmet Health Care Center matter involved the consolidation of three negligence suits against
nursing homes in West Virginia. Id. Each involved an agreement to arbitrate all disputes except
collection matters. Id. In each of the cases a family member had commenced suit in state court
alleging negligence-caused injuries or harm resulting in death. Id. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia issued a decision regarding all three matters and held that, as a matter of public
policy, under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission agreement
adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that resulted in a personal injury or wrongful death
was not enforceable. Id. The state court considered the preemption issue and concluded that
Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to personal injury or wrongful death suits that "only
collaterally derive from a written agreement that evidences a transaction affecting interstate
commerce ......
The U.S. Supreme Court made a very clear statement. It said the West Virginia Court's
interpretation of the FAA was "both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the
precedents of this Court." Id. Referring to the FAA the Court said that the text includes "no
exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims." Id. Therefore, relying upon its earlier
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), West Virginia's prohibition
against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal injury or wrongful death claims against nursing
homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim and that rule is
contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA. Id.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also proposed an alternative holding that the
particular clauses in two of the cases were unconscionable. Id. The Supreme Court remanded these
cases for further review in West Virginia to determine whether the arbitration clauses in two of the
cases were unenforceable under state common law principles not specific to arbitration and
preempted by the FAA. Id. Thus, a rather resounding endorsement of arbitration - again - by the
Supreme Court.
213. A recent development is worth noting with regard to the fits and starts for mandatory
arbitration. Carlyle Group LP had planned to protect itself from class action lawsuits with
mandatory arbitration. See Miles Weiss, Jesse Hamilton & Cristina Alesci, Carlyle Drops ClassAction Lawsuit Ban as Opposition Mounts, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2012, 5:57 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/carlyle-drops-class-action-lawsuit-ban.html.
The
buyout firm had amended a regulatory filing to require future shareholders to resolve claims against
it through arbitration. Id. This provision would have forced a further clarification by the Supreme
Court. There had already been congressional comments against the proposal and, in the past, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had blocked a less restrictive arbitration clause more
than twenty years ago. See id. The potential impact for closely held firms and hedge fund and
buyout firms, also structured as limited partnerships, would have been significant. However, in a
rapid about-face, the Carlyle Group announced that it was withdrawing the mandatory arbitration
clause included in the registration statement in response to pressure from shareholder rights
activists, potential investors, and the SEC. Id. The SEC has generally disfavored mandatory
shareholder arbitration provisions. See id. However, the Supreme Court, in 2011, upheld an
arbitration provision in a consumer contract that allowed class-wide procedures, finding that the
FAA preempted California law. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011). Building on that decision, Carlyle might have prohibited class action arbitration. Since
Carlyle pulled the trigger, this clarification will have to wait for a further Supreme Court
pronouncement on proscriptions to future class action like the one proposed by Carlyle in its LP.
For a discussion of how courts treat collective arbitration and distinguish such cases from class
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comments may be helpful. Utilizing notice provisions similar to courts
will minimize objections. Discovery procedures need to be tailored in
advance and fine-tuned to avoid the possibility of matching the time and
expense of litigation.
In general, the benefit of arbitration to all concerned is to provide a
more user-friendly process that is efficient and less costly than litigation.
If it is not, it will be disfavored as too cumbersome and more
problematic than the court system. Avoiding litigation in court is only a
positive if the arbitration is fair to all users and gets the job done at a
"price point" that makes it a good investment. After all, even the use of
arbitration is subject to the free market.

action arbitration, see Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, Collective Arbitration in New York,
N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Feb. 2012, at 38-40.
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